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CREATES A NEW TEST TO DETERMINE
WHETHER EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT
IS APPROPRIATE
Jennifer Allen Seymour*
N McBee v. Delica Co.,' the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided
not to apply the well-known subject matter jurisdiction test from Van-
ity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.2 to a case in which an American
sued a foreign defendant under the Lanham Act for actions that the de-
fendant took in Japan.3 Instead, the court disaggregated the Vanity Fair
test, holding "that the Lanham Act grants subject matter jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only when the conduct has
a substantial effect on United States commerce."'4 By limiting the test to
a single factor, the court removed the element of comity from its subject
matter jurisdiction analysis. This decision was a mistake because the First
Circuit based its reasoning on dicta, analogized to antitrust cases when
adequate support for including comity in the analysis is found in trade-
mark cases, and likely violated legislative wishes.
The plaintiff in this case, Cecil McBee ("McBee"), is a famous Ameri-
can jazz musician who teaches music at a conservatory in Boston and
occasionally tours in Japan. The defendant, Delica Co. ("Delica"), is a
Japanese corporation that sells a line of girls' clothing and accessories in
Japan under the trade name "Cecil McBee. ' '5 Further, Delica owns shops
in Japan named "Cecil McBee" which are the only locations that sell
"Cecil McBee" products.6 Delica maintains a website, written primarily
in Japanese that contains information about "Cecil McBee" products but
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2007;
B.S.M., Tulane University, summa cum laude, 2004.
1. 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005).
2. 234 F.2d 635, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
3. McBee, 417 F.3d at 110-11.
4. Id. at 120.
5. Id. at 111-12.
6. Id. at 112.
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does not allow online purchases.7 Delica also circulates a "Cecil McBee"
catalog, written primarily in Japanese with some English words for effect,
that contains the telephone and fax numbers for a company that
purchases the "Cecil McBee" orders from Delica and ships the products
through another company.8 This shipping company had not shipped any
"Cecil McBee" items outside of Japan, and Delica's policy was to decline
orders from the United States.9
When McBee discovered that Delica was using his name for a girls'
clothing line, he contacted an American lawyer who advised him that he
would not have personal jurisdiction over Delica in the United States.10
McBee therefore turned to the Japanese Patent Office to invalidate
Delica's trademark of "Cecil McBee."" While the Japanese Patent Of-
fice sided with McBee and invalidated Delica's trademark, the Tokyo
High Court vacated this decision, reinstating "Cecil McBee" as Delica's
trademark.1 2 To avoid further risk of litigation, Delica began a policy of
not shipping "Cecil McBee" products to the United States.13 Despite this
strategy, McBee's hired investigators, making clear that they were United
States residents, convinced vendors to ship $2,500 of "Cecil McBee"
products to the United States either directly or through an arrangement
whereby the vendors shipped the products to an address in Japan and
then forwarded the packages to the United States. 14 No other evidence
of "Cecil McBee" sales to the United States existed, however, nor was
there evidence of "Cecil McBee" products entering the United States af-
ter Delica sold them in Japan.15 McBee claims that he has been affected
by Delica's conduct in several ways, including that friends and fans have
been confused from seeing Delica's "Cecil McBee" trademark, his repu-
tation has been injured because people have insinuated that he is "'into
young girls,"' his class enrollment has dropped, and fans at his Japanese
concerts have become younger, associating him with Delica's clothing
line.16
McBee sued Delica in the United States under the Lanham Act, alleg-
ing trademark dilution and unfair competition based on false endorse-
ment. 17 McBee brought three claims against Delica, including an
injunction barring United States access to Delica's website, damages for
harm from Delica's Japanese sales, and an injunction barring Delica from









15. Id. at 113-14.
16. Id. at 114.
17. Id. at 115.
18. Id. at 111.
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action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 19 Applying a modified
version of the Vanity Fair test, the magistrate judge recommended that
McBee's Lanham Act claims for injunctive relief be dismissed, but that
his damages claim go forward.20 The magistrate judge applied a test that
required consideration of the following elements: whether the defen-
dant's conduct has some effect on United States commerce; whether the
defendant is a United States citizen; and whether a conflict exists with
trademark rights established under foreign law.21 The district court did
not fully adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation and instead held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all of McBee's claims. 22
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but on different
grounds. 23 Rather than analyzing the above three factors to determine
whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a defendant's extra-
territorial conduct in a Lanham Act case, the First Circuit held that courts
should consider only whether the conduct has a substantial effect on
United States commerce. 24 Applying this newly formulated test, the
court decided it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over McBee's
claim for an injunction barring access to Delica's website nor over Mc-
Bee's claim of damages for Delica's sales in Japan. In both instances,
Delica's conduct did not substantially effect United States commerce. 25
The First Circuit found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Mc-
Bee's claim for an injunction barring Delica's sales in the United States
because the sales constituted domestic conduct; however, the court
granted summary judgment to Delica on this claim because it found no
justification for injunctive relief. 26
The First Circuit and other courts that have utilized similar subject
matter jurisdiction analyses based their tests on the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.27 In this case, the Supreme Court
clearly established that plaintiffs can use the Lanham Act to hold defend-
ants liable for their conduct outside of the United States.28 To reach this
conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on Congress's power to regulate its
citizens' conduct regardless of whether a citizen acts within United States
borders or extraterritorially. 29 Congress's authority over a foreign citi-
zen's extraterritorial conduct stems from its power over foreign com-
merce.30 Although the Supreme Court did not establish a subject matter
jurisdiction test in Steele, several courts have developed their own analy-
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id.
21. McBee v. Delica Co., No. 02-198-P-C, 2004 WL 2674360, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 19,
2004).
22. McBee, 417 F.3d at 116.
23. See id. at 111.
24. See id. at 120.
25. Id. at 124-25.
26. Id. at 122-23.
27. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
28. See id. at 285-86.
29. McBee, 417 F.3d at 118.
30. See id. at 118.
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ses.31 The "best-known" test is the one put forth by the Second Circuit in
Vanity Fair.32 The Second Circuit found that the Supreme Court empha-
sized three factors in Steele: "(1) the defendant's conduct had a substan-
tial effect on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was a United
States citizen and the United States has a broad power to regulate the
conduct of its citizens in foreign countries; and (3) there was no conflict
with trade-mark rights established under the foreign law." 33 Most subse-
quently-developed subject matter jurisdiction tests are a variation of the
Vanity Fair test.34
The First Circuit's test in McBee differs from the Second Circuit's Van-
ity Fair test in that McBee disaggregates the elements of the Vanity Fair
test.35 Under the McBee test, before a court begins the subject matter
jurisdiction analysis, it must ask if the defendant is an American citizen. 36
The court only proceeds with the McBee test if the defendant is not an
American citizen.37 After meeting this threshold requirement of foreign
citizenry, the court applies the test by asking whether the defendant's
conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce. 38 If the con-
duct does not have a substantial effect, then the court does not have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. 39 Alternatively, if the
defendant's extraterritorial conduct substantially effects United States
commerce, then the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.40
While the Vanity Fair test includes comity as one of its elements, this fac-
tor is not part of the McBee test; instead, a court only considers comity
after finding subject matter jurisdiction.4' If conflict with foreign law ex-
ists, the court may then decide not to hear the case despite having juris-
diction over it. n2
The First Circuit based its decision to disaggregate the Vanity Fair test
on the Supreme Court's holding in the domain of antitrust law.43 For this
comparative analysis, the First Circuit turned to the case of Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.44 In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court stated
that courts have jurisdiction over extraterritorial antitrust conduct "that
was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in
the United States. ' 45 The Supreme Court also noted that comity con-
31. Id. at 117.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34. See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 n.8
(5th Cir. 1983) (replacing the "substantial effect" element with "some effect").
35. McBee, 417 F.3d at 121.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 120.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 121.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 119.
44. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
45. Id. at 796.
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cerns should not be considered until a court first determines that it has
subject matter jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct.46 The First
Circuit drew a parallel from antitrust to trademarks, holding that the ap-
propriate test for subject matter jurisdiction is whether the conduct has a
substantial effect on United States commerce. 47 Further, comity should
not be an element of the test but an additional consideration once subject
matter jurisdiction is already found.48 The First Circuit believed that
analogizing from antitrust to trademark law was appropriate because the
Supreme Court has decided antitrust cases more recently than Lanham
Act cases.49 Also, "[i]n both the antitrust and the Lanham Act areas,
there is a risk that absent a certain degree of extraterritorial enforcement,
violators will either take advantage of international coordination
problems or hide in countries without efficacious antitrust or trademark
laws, thereby avoiding legal authority. '50
As a precursory matter, it is odd that the court chose to analogize a
Lanham Act claim with an antitrust claim, as trademark law and antitrust
law have directly opposing policy concerns. Whereas the concern in anti-
trust law is preventing monopolies, the concern in trademark law is pro-
tecting the monopolistic use of a trademark. The First Circuit's decision
to disaggregate comity from the subject matter jurisdiction test is further
misguided. First, McBee's holding that comity should not be an element
of the subject matter jurisdiction test is based merely on dicta from Hart-
ford Fire. After noting that comity concerns should not be considered
when deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists but rather after
the foreign conduct has been deemed subject to United States jurisdic-
tion, the Court stated: "[i]n any event, the parties conceded jurisdiction at
oral argument ... and we see no need to address this contention here."' 51
Thus, to the extent that the First Circuit grounded its decision to remove
the comity element on the Supreme Court's dicta in Hartford Fire, the
First Circuit's holding is baseless.
Beyond this reliance on dicta, the First Circuit had no reason to turn to
antitrust case law in the first place. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., a case
based on trademark law, the Supreme Court emphasized the factors it
believed were important in deciding subject matter jurisdiction over for-
eign conduct. 52 The Second Circuit noted that in Steele, the Supreme
Court focused on the three factors included in the Vanity Fair test, one of
which is comity.53 Because the Supreme Court has already emphasized
the factors it believes are important to consider when deciding subject
matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct in a Lanham Act claim,
46. Id. at 797 n.24.
47. McBee 1, 417 F.3d at 121.
48. Id. at 120-21.
49. Id. at 119.
50. Id.
51. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797 n.24.
52. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-89 (1952).
53. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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there was no need for the First Circuit to draw a parallel to the Supreme
Court's rulings in antitrust.
Finally, Congress likely wants comity included in the subject matter ju-
risdiction analysis. Comity is such an important concept to the legislature
that a canon of statutory construction exists that advises courts to inter-
pret statutes in such a way that does not violate the laws of another coun-
try.54 "Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those
customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe. '55 Fur-
ther, the United States government has participated in an ongoing effort
to harmonize international trademark law, as shown through its involve-
ment in international treaties aimed at standardizing international trade-
mark protection. 56 By considering international comity an element of the
test to determine subject matter jurisdiction, courts would further Con-
gress's attempt to standardize trademark law and emphasize the impor-
tance of comity.
After stating that it did not believe that comity should be considered an
element of the subject matter jurisdiction test, the First Circuit in McBee
noted that Congress is free to change the courts' power to exercise sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, but it has chosen not to do
so.5 7 Courts have routinely included comity in the test for subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign conduct since Vanity Fair was decided in 1956.58
Congress has had nearly a half-century to disaggregate this test, but it has
chosen not to take this action. Thus, Congress must not be dissatisfied
with the inclusion of comity in the subject matter jurisdiction analysis.
Despite the First Circuit's departure from Vanity Fair, the court's ruling
in McBee will not likely have a drastic effect on which extraterritorial
conduct Lanham Act cases are heard in American courts. While the
court changed the look of the test, disaggregating the three elements and
including only one as the proper subject matter jurisdiction test, a court
will still consider the other two elements in rendering its decision. The
court merely considers whether the defendant is a foreign citizen, previ-
ously the first element, before it applies the test; after it finds subject
matter jurisdiction proper, then the court considers comity, traditionally
the third element of the analysis. Although the substantive outcome may
not change, the First Circuit's ruling has other negative implications. In
particular, removing comity from the subject matter jurisdiction test may
cause courts to minimize the importance of comity in deciding whether to
hear a case founded on extraterritorial conduct. As discussed above,
comity is an important issue to Congress and should not be discounted.
54. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (1804)).
55. Id. at 815.
56. See Robert W. Sacof, Trademark Law in the Technology-Driven Global Market-
place, 4 YALE SyMP. L. & TECH. 8 (2001).




Further, by dismissing the three-factor test used by most federal courts,
the First Circuit promotes inconsistency in federal case law.
In McBee, the First Circuit Court of Appeals chose to disregard the
established test for subject matter jurisdiction in Lanham Act cases in-
volving extraterritorial conduct. The court's reason for disaggregating
comity from the test is based on dicta and thus is unsupported. The Su-
preme Court already emphasized in Steele what it believed was important
to the jurisdictional analysis and chose to include international comity.
Further, Congress would likely agree that comity is a pivotal element of
the test. The Supreme Court should reconsider this issue soon and clearly
establish the proper test for extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Act.
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